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Following the 1973 quadrupling of. oil
prices, the oil producing countries began to
invest a substantial portion of their sur-
pluses in the Eurocurrency market. As a
result new interest was sparked in the role
of the Eurocurrency market in international
finance. With the annual OPEC (Organiza-
tion of Petroleum Exporting Countries) cur-
rent account surpluses expected at around
$50 billion for the next several years (per-
haps aggregating some $250—$300 billion
before leveling off), the Eurocurrency mar-
ket's capacity to perform a major function
in the recycling of petrodollars has been a
source of uneasiness in financial markets.
The principal explanation for the develop-
ment of the Eurocurrency market lies in its
ability to surmount various legal barriers to
the how of funds between national capital
markets, and in the cost advantage to banks
in dealing with liabilities denominated in
foreign currencies free of national currency
deposit reserve requirements. Multinational
firms based in the United States have been
able to borrow in the Eurocurrency market
from foreign branches of U.S. banks, un-
restrained by U.S. capital export. controls,
and to hold their liquid funds in Eurodollars
and other Eurocurrency deposits subject to
neither national currency reserve require-
ments nor U.S. interest payment regulations.
Thus, interestrates on loans have been
lower and rates paid on deposits higher
than they would have been in transactions
carried on with U.S. resident banks. Liquid
Note: This paper was completed in June 1975.
asset holders throughout the world can ad-
just their portfolio holdings in a variety of
currencies without having to deal with for-
eign banks, and the U.S. and foreign resi-
dents can receive interest on dollar deposits
with a maturity of less than thirty days,
even overnight deposits.Finally, the
vast worldwide interbank market for Euro-
currencies provides a mechanism which al-
lows banks to adjust their position in vari-
ous currencies at a minimum transactions
cost.
The Origin of the Eurocurrency Market
and Its Growth to 1973
A Eurocurrency deposit is a time deposit
denominated in the currency of a country
other than the country in which the bank
is located.Sources of funds for the Euro-
dollar market include Eurodollar deposits
of nonbank firms and individuals, central
bank deposits, and dollars injected into the
market by the Eurobanks themselves, either
by the conversion of other currencies into
dollars or through swap transactions with
central banks(i.e., dollars acquired from
the central banks in exchange for domestic
currencies). About three-fourths of total
Eurocurrency deposits are denominated in
dollars,withthe remainderin German
marks,Swissfrancs,poundssterling,
and French francs, in that order.
Demand for Eurocurrency loans, rather
than supply of deposits, has proven to be
the prime mover behind the past expansionphases ofthe Eurocurrency market, and
foreign branches of U.S. commercial banks
have played a leading role in this expansion.
U.S. parent banks increased the number of
their foreign branches substantially during
the 1960s.They were encouraged in this
expansionbytheexemptionofforeign
branches from Regulation Q (which sets
ceilings on interest rates paid on deposits
made for more than 30 days and prohibits
payment of any interest at all on deposits
for less than 30 days) and from the Fed's
reserve requirements. They were prodded,
also, by the credit stringency in the United
States and the financing requirements of
their corporate customers abroad. Borrow-
ing by the head offices from foreign branches
jumped from $1.2 billionat the end of
1964 to a high of $14.5 billion at the end
of November 1969, an important factor in
the rapid expansion of the Eurocurrency
market during that period (from a net size
of about $14 billion to an estimated $50
billion).'
The repayment of parent-bank indebted-
ness to foreign branches (down to $1.3
billion by the end of 1971) that followed
the imposition of reserve requirements by
the Federal Reserve authorities late in 1969
failed to hamper the continued growth of
the Eurocurrency market. (Until September
1969, Eurodollar borrowings were not sub-
jecttoreserverequirements.Effective
September 1969, a 10% marginal reserve
requirement was placed on any increase in
Eurodollar borrowing by U.S. banks from
foreign branches above the May 1969 level.)
The sizeof the Eurocurrency marketis
measured by total Eurocurrency deposits of Euro-
banks for which reports are available less inter-
bank balances. The gross size of the Eurocurrency
market as of mid-May 1974 was estimatedat
$360 billion (World Financial Markets, Morgan
Guaranty Trust Company, New York, July16,
1974, p. 4).Figures given by the Morgan Guar-
anty Trust Company are somewhat higher than
thosereportedbythe Bank forInternational
Settlements because 'of the wider coverage of the
former. The Eurobariking system includes banks
outside of Europe.
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The repayments. together with additional
Eurodollar deposits, were used for loans to
U.S. firms operating abroad and to other
foreign businesses and governments. In fact,
between the end of 1969 and the end of
1972, the Eurocurrencv market more than
doubled in size, to an estimated S105 billion.
Demand for such Eurocurrency loans was
stimulated by U.S. government controls, both
on loans by banks and other financial in-
stitutions to foreign residents, including U.S.
subsidiaries,andondirectinvestments
abroad,2 which drove parent firms in the
United States to finance their foreign capital
expenditures by borrowing from the Euro-
dollar and Eurobond markets.
The growing weakness of the dollar in
1970 and 1971 also contributed to an in-
crease in the demand for Eurodollar loans.
With a view to speculating against the dollar,
borrowers converted their dollar credits into
currencies such as German marks and Swiss
francs.The introductionoffloating ex-
changeratesinMarch1973,however,
tended to reduce Eurodollar borrowing of a
speculative nature.
The relative importance of the various
sources of Eurodollar deposits has under-
gone considerable shifts'over the past decade.
Prior to 1970, the major source of Euro-
currency funds was private nonbank de-
posits, including those of multinational firms.
Federal Reserve controls on the interest
rates that U.S. banks could pay to depositors
played an important part here. Both U.S.
residents and residents of foreign countries
(including subsidiaries of U.S. finns) were
induced by the higher interest rates paid
abroad to hold their dollar deposits in, the
form of Eurodollar deposits.During the
1971—1973 period,central banks'dollar
deposits in Eurobanks provided a major
source of the increase in Eurodollar funds.
2EffectiveJanuary1,1968, mandatory ceilings
were placed, on U.S. direct foreign investments
witheitherdollarsexported fromtheUnited
States or with foreign earnings. No controls were
placedonU.S.corporateinvestmentsabroad
financed by funds borrowed abroad.Finally, in 1974 theoil-exporting countries
became the most important single source of
Eurocurrency funds, while their borrowing
fromtheEurocurrencymarketsimulta-
neously plummeted.
With the growing apprehension over the
exchange value of the dollar in 1970—1971,
changes occurred in the makeup as well as
inthe sources of Eurocurrency holdings.
Foreign private nonbank holdings of Euro-
dollar deposits tended to decline, while hold-
ingsofnondollar Eurocurrency deposits
grew significantly, indicating a preference of
portfolio holders for nondollar currencies.
After December 1971, however, foreign pri-
nonbank holdings of Eurodollar de-
posits resumed their growth, although. the
growthrateofnondollarEurocurrency
deposits was somewhat higher, at least up
to December 1971.
The Inflationary Impact of the
Eurocurrency Market
The Eurocurrency market has been sub-
ject to criticism on various fronts, partly on
the grounds that it has contributed to world-
wide inflation and partly on the grounds
that the system has led to improper banking
practices exempt from national and interna-
tional controls on the quantity and quality
of credit.The question of its inflationary
impacthinges on theanalyst's fOcus—
whether one is concerned with the creation
of additional means of payment, or whether
one regards the operation of an international
financial intermediary per se as inflationary.
Some argue, for example, that the creation of
financialintermediaries whose obligations
constitute liquid assets increases the demand
for goods and services by economizing on
money or increasing its velocity.3 But what-
everitsvalidity,this argument must be
separated from the position that the opera-
tion of the Eurocurrency market involves an
expansionofdirectmeansof payment
See J. G. Gurley and E. S. Shaw, "Financial
Aspects of Economic Development," American




deposits, they are not ordinarily used as a
direct means of payment. The creation of a
Eurodollar deposit as a result of the deposit
of a foreign currency by an individual or
nonbank firm does not create new purchas-
ing power.Itis analogous to the deposit
in a savings bank of a check drawn on a
demand deposit. (Much of the debate re-
garding multiple expansion of the Eurocur-
rency depositsarises, however, from the
identification of such deposits with direct
means of payment.) The existence of non-
bank Eurocurency deposits ultimately de-
pends on the willingness of individuals and
firms to hold them. When the collective de-
mand for Eurocurrency deposits declines,
they must firstbe converted into money
before they can be exchanged for other
assets,and inthe processtheir volume
shrinks. By contrast, the volume of money
is not reduced when a decline in collective
demand occurs.In fact,while trying to
reduce their collective holdings of money,
individuals bid up the prices of nonmonetary
assets, or cause production and employment
to expand to the point where the demand
for money just equals supply. As a result,
interest rates may also change.'
The directinflationaryimpact ofthe
Eurocurrency market results from events
that expand the means of payment in. the
hands of the nonbank public. A prime ex-
ample is central bank deposits of reserve
currenciesin Eurobanks.(Central banks
usually deposit reserve currencies in Euro-
banks of other countriesrather thanin
resident banks.) Such deposits do not in-.
volve a shift of private funds from one
liquid asset to another.Neither do they
reduce central bank reserves: not only are
these Eurodollar deposits counted as part of
central bank reserves, but to the extent that
they are used by the Eurobanks to make
analysisisbased on L. B. Yeager. "Es-
sential Properties of the Medium of Exchange."
21, no.1.1968, pp. 45—68.
3Eurodollar loans which are then converted
into national currencies, they eventually re-
turn to the central banks, thus increasing
foreign currency reserves. The direct infla-
tionary impact results from the dollar pay-
ments to the Eurobanks, which proceed to
make dollar loans to nonbank customers in
their own or some other country and thereby
increase the supply of money in the hands
of the public.Thus, when borrowers of
Eurodollars deposited by a central bank sell
dollars in the exchange market for national
currencies, the volume of money increases
abroad. When borrowed dollars are used
for purchasing goods or services from the
United States or for making investments in
this country, the volume of money expands
in the hands of U.S. residents, not abroad.
Eurobanks themselves may also generate
Eurodollar loans by converting national cur-
rencies into dollars, and lending the dollars
in the Eurodollar market—but they must
have excess reserves for this purpose.If
the loans are made to residents who con-
vert the dollars into national currency de-
posits, the supply of money in the hands of
the public will increase.If they are made
abroad through the Eurodollar market, the
expansion of bank reserves and national
money supply occurs in other countries,
while reserves of the lending country's bank-
ing system contract.Another way to gen-
erate funds for the Eurodollar market is
arranging swap transactions with the central
bank of the country in which the Eurobanks
are located.Such transactions involve the
same type of credit expansion as that re-
sulting from central bank deposits in Euro-
banks described above.Thus, the factors
that lead to an increase in the means of
payment are expansion of bank reserves as
a consequence of central bank activities and
credit expansion by banks on the basis of
their excess reserves—not simply the shift-
ing of nonbank currency balances in Euro-
dollar deposits.
During 1971 the volume of Eurodollar
loans expanded, while the volume of private
nonbank deposits declined.There isevi-
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dence, moreover, that in 1972 private non-
bank Eurodollar deposits rose only moder-
ately compared with the rise in Eurodollar
loans to nonbank customers. Thus in con-
siderablemeasurethecreditsextended
through the Eurodollar market have been
provided directly or indirectly by the cen-
tral banks rather than by private nonbank
Eurodollar deposits, and such credit expan-
sion is clearly inflationary in the sense that
there occurs a net expansion in the means
of payment in the hands of the nonbank
public.For the most part this expansion
has affected national currencies outside the
United States, although some of the dollars
channeled into Eurobanks by foreign cen-
tral banks contributed to the increase in
money circulation in the United States as
well.
Petrodollar Recycling in 1974 and
the Future of the Eurocurrency
Market
During the first half of 1974 the Euro-
currency market grew at an annual rate of
about 50 percent, slightly ahead of the 1973
growthrate.The 1974 expansion was
dominated by the OPEC oil surpluses, both
on the supply and the demand side—the
large increase in Eurocurrency deposits by
the OPEC countries was matched by heavier
borrowing by the oil importing countries to
finance their oil deficits.The largest bor-
rowerswerethedevelopedcountries—
France, Italy, Japan, and the United King-
dom—but substantial amounts were also
borrowed by Argentina,Brazil,Greece,
Mexico, Peru, and the Philippines.In ad-
ditiontotheir Eurocurrency borrowings,
Western European countries borrowed sub-
stantial amounts from U.S. banks.
In the third quarter of 1974 both the
supply of Eurocurrency deposits and the
effective demand for loans declined sharply.
The failure of the Bankhaus I. D. Herstatt
in Cologne in June 1974 along with a few
other bank failures in the United States and
Europe, plus heavy losses by a number ofbanks on Eurocurrency credits, both lowered
the confidence of Eurocurrency depositors
and made the Eurobanks more cautious in
granting credits.Until recently, a few large
international banks (the banks where the
Arab oil governments typically make their
Eurocurrency deposits) have been able to
place their excess funds in the interbank
marketattheLondon interbankoffer
(LIBO) rate. This rate is normally slightly
higher (about one-eighth of a point) than
the rate paid to Eurobank depositors and
one and a half points lower than the rate
for prime borrowers.Hundreds of banks
throughout the world participate in the in-
terbank market; the deposited funds might
go through several banks before they are
lent to a nonbank borrower.But the vi-
abilityof the system depends upon the
solvency of each link in the chain.Bank
failures, though few in number, have reduced
confidence in the interbank system, with
the result that banks with surplus funds
now are unwilling to redeposit in any but
the largest and strongest banks in the inter-
national system. As a result, in the second
half of 1974 the LIBO rate at which banks
borrow from the market varied significantly
with the class and reputation of the borrow-
ing bank.These developments have un-
doubtedly reduced the efficiency of the in-
terbank market for enabling Eurobanks to
adjusttheir Eurocurrency positions,and
have increased costsinreflection of the
risk.
The demand for Eurocurrency loans was
curtailed by the deepening recession in the
latter part of 1974 which probably reduced
the credit demand of industrial firms with
a high credit rating. The decrease in Euro-
bank lending was accompanied by a drop
in U.S.-bank-reported capital outflow from
57.5 billion in the second quarter of 1974
to Sl.5 billion in the third
Some Eurobanks have been reluctant to
accept large OPEC deposits because of the
Surveyof Current Business, December 1974.p.
30.
inability of the banks to place funds profit-
ably and safely either in loans to nonbank
borrowers or in the interbank market or
because of the decline in the ratio of bank
equity to bank liabilities. As a result, many
have voiced concern about the Eurocurrency
market'sroleinthe recycling of petro-
dollars.It is important to note here, how-
ever, that total growth of the Eurocurrency
market resumed in the final quarter of 1974,
continued, and became more expansionary
in the first quarter of 1975.
Can Eurobanks continuetofinancea
large volume of intermediate- and long-term
investments with relatively short-term Euro-
currency deposits held by a few OPEC gov-
ernments or their agencies? This is one of
the major question marks in the petrodollar
picture.Initially the fluctuation of world-
wide interest rates inhibited the extension
of Eurocurrency loans for long periods of
time. The extension of medium- and long-
term Eurocurrency credit of three to five
years' and occasionally up to ten years'
maturity was made possible, however, by
the introduction of revolving Eurocurrency
credits, with interest rates subject to adjust-
ment every six months on the basis of pre-
vailing market rates.Even large projects,
such as hydroelectric dams and mines, re-
quiring loans of $100 million or more can
now be financed by banking consortia or-
ganized for this purpose. In some cases the
loans are denominated in several currencies
—Eurosterling and Euro-Deutsche marks
along with Eurodollars. Beginning in 1971,
an increasing proportion of Eurocurrency
loans was made to developing countries. In
1972 and 1973 the latter accounted for
nearlyhalfofthepubliclyannounced
medium- and long-term Eurocurrency cred-
its, with substantial amounts going to oil-
exportingcountries.Theexpansionof
Eurocurrency credits in the first half of 1974
reflected both the growing deficits of oil-
importing countries and a continued uptrend
in medium- and long-term industrial credits
(including sizable borrowing by U.S. com-
panies). Although Eurobanks are alleged
5reluctant to accept short-term deposits and
use the proceeds for making long-term loans,
thistypeoffinancialintermediationhas
been taking place right along and is con-
sidered normal practice. The Eurobanks do
•need assurance that the large OPEC de-
positors will only withdraw their deposits
gradually, however, and will do so over a
long period of time.It would be highly
desirableif the OPEC governments could
be induced to accept deposits with longer
maturities—say, up to two years or more
—either on a fixed or on a variable interest
rate basis.In addition, machinery could be
established for consultation and coordina-
tion between representatives of the Euro-
banks and the money managers of the OPEC
countries.
The question may also be raised whether
the channeling of petrodollars through the
Eurocurrency market is more inflationary
than, say, direct investment by the OPEC
countries in the oil-importing countries. As
already indicated above, depositing dollars
in the Eurodollar market isnot initself
inflationary sinceit does not create addi-
tional means of payment.If, for example,
nationalcurrenciesareexchangedfor
dollars by the central banks for making pay-
ments to the OPEC countries and thereby
money supply in the hands of the public is
reduced by a like amount, the redepositing
of the dollars in the Eurodollar market by
the OPEC countries simply restores the na-
tional money supply to its former volume as
the dollars loaned to nonbank borrowers
are converted back into national currencies
at the central banks. (Actually, the acquisi-
tion of dollars with demand deposits in the
hands of the public should reduce Eurobank
reserves, while redepositing of these dollars
in the Eurodollar market restores Eurobank
reserves.) If there is an injection of central
bank credit into the system in the process
of financing the oil deficits, however, a net
expansion of national money supply in the
oil-importingcountrieswillresult.This
would be true, for example, if the central
banks provided the dollars for making pay-
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ments to the OPEC countries without allow-
ing a reduction in reserves of the banking
system, and then permitted bank reserves to
rise as the recycled petrodollars are con-
verted into national currencies for loans and
investments in the domestic economy.
One of the most notable aspects of re-
cycling petrodollars via the Eurocurrency
market is the wide distribution this affords
the OPEC funds—a far wider distribution
than they would receive as investments in
national currency deposits or in the short-
term securities of a few countries with well-
developed money markets.Withoutthe
worldwide intermediation of the Eurocur-
rency market, oil deficit countries not re-
ceivingdirect OPEC investments would
have to resort to direct intergovernmental
borrowing or to the proposed Organization
for Economic Cooperation and Develop-
ment (OECD) "Financial Support Fund,"
(the U.S. government has proposed the es-
tablishment of a $25billionFinancial Sup-
port Fund to be contributed by the mem-
bers of the OECD) out of which loans
would be issued to OECD countries co-
operating in the International Energy Pro-
gram.These loans would be made under
specified conditions for dealing with tem-
porary balance of payments deficits arising
out of the. oil crisis.Deficits of developing
countries with lower credit standing can
be covered either by direct assistance from
the OPEC countries or through the Inter-
national Monetary Fund Oil Facility. The
OPEC countries reap benefits, too, from
the Eurocurrency market's operation: their
returns on Eurocurrency deposits are gen-
erally higher than those on time deposits
and other assetsof similar maturity ac-
quired in national money markets.
Itis,therefore, premature to conclude
that the Eurocurrency market will no longer
play an important role in intermediating the
OPEC surpluses. Confidence in the market
has been strengthened by recent assurances
from leading central banks, including the
Federal Reserve, that they would support
the Eurocurrency market in the event of anabrupt withdrawal of petrodollars or other
deposits. A narrowing of the differential be-
tween interbank rates charged to different
classes of Eurobanks in early 1975 has also
beenobserved.Lower short-termrates
should induce OPEC countries to accept
longer maturities, a stabilizing factor.At
the end of 1974, in fact,it was reported
that Arab funds were being committed for
somewhat longer periods. Also, an increase
in the spread between deposit rates and rates
charged to borrowers will increase the profit-
ability of Eurocurrency operations and thus
attract more equity into the Eurobanking
business as well as provide funds for re-
invested earnings.
Nevertheless, the foreign exchange risk
faced by the OPEC depositors in the Euro-
currency market does present a problem.
Undoubtedly these countries would like to
havetheirassetsdenominatedin SDRs
(special drawingrights),but Eurobanks
would probably find it very difficult to make
a substantial volume of loans denominated
in SDRs. In time, however, we are likely to
see an increasing amount of private inter-
national transactions made in those terms.
Both from the borrower's and the lender's
point of view, the dollar remains the opti-
mum currency for international debt trans-
actions.Despite the depreciationof the
dollar in terms of certain Western European
currencies since September 1974,-the effec-
tive (trade-weighted) exchange value of the
dollar has been relatively stable since March
1973; at mid-April 1975, the effective ex-
change value of the dollar was the same as
its average value in March 1973, and re-
cently it has been creeping upward. For a
variety of reasons the predominant interna-
tional role of the dollar appears secure, and
its position in the Eurocurrency market is
not likelyto change substantiallyinthe
foreseeable future.
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